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ABSTRACT
One simple test ofthe long-runviability ofan exchange-rate peg, which complements tests based
on market expectations, is to ask whether theimplicit inflation target ofthe pegging country is the
same as that of the anchor country. If the implicit inflation targets of the two countries are
different, the peg’s long-run credibility can be rejected. The implicit inflation targetis defined
as the policy-implied, trend rate of inflation. The proposed test is applied to the Austrian
experience with a ‘hard currency’ policy aimed at targeting its exchange rate with the Deutsche
mark.
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Introduction
One way to determine whether a hard currency-the fixing of one’s exchange rate to
alow inflation country-is credible is to examine the implicit expectations measured from
forward rates. Svensson (1991) constructed a credibility test that uses the uncovered
interest rate parity condition as a measure ofmarket expectations in order to determine the
probability that an exchange rate target range will be maintained throughout the life ofa
forward contract. The test, commonly known as the “simplest” test for target zone
credibility, consists ofexamining whether or not forward exchange rates fall within theannounced exchange rate band. If the forward rates fall outside the band, then credibility
is rejected. Forward foreign exchange contracts, however, generally are written to mature
in a year or less. Svensson (1994) has addressed the need to evaluate longer-run market
expectations of inflation by filtering yield-curve data to arrive at an estimate of expected
inflation throughout the life of long-term government bonds.
In our evaluation of a country’s inflation outlook and thefuture prospects of its exchange-
rate peg, we ask whether the implicit inflation target in the country pursuing a hard-
currency policy is the same as that in the anchor country. If the implicit inflation targets
of the two countries are substantially different, credibility can be rejected. The implicit
inflation target or baseline inflation rate is defined as a policy-implied, trend rate of infla-
tion. Unlike Svensson’s test, which measures exchange rate credibility in terms of implicit
market expectations, our proposed test consists of estimating an implicit inflation target
based on current and past monetary settings. The test attempts to answer whether the
hard currency policy is a sustainable policy under the current monetary regime. If the
implicit inflation target of the pegging country is considerably higher than the target of
the anchor country, then the hard-currency policy is not sustainable and therefore lacks
credibility.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the success of the Austrian hard-currency
policy by comparing its implicit inflation target with Germany’s corresponding rate. Aus-
tria is often viewed as a ‘pilot example’ of a small country joining the European Monetary
3System (EMS). The Austrian National Bank has pursued a ‘hard currency’ policy by peg-
ging the schilling to the Deutsche mark since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System.
The schilling’s stability, together with Austria’s inflation performance during the 1980s and
1990s, suggests that the hard-currency policy is credible within financial markets. This pa-
per seeks to highlight the basis of that credibility — similar long-run target rates of inflation
across the two countries.
The indicator model of Dueker and Fischer (1994) is used to measure the implicit
long-run target rates of inflation in the two countries. The indicator model aims to inform
policymakers on a timely basis ofthe likely effect ofcurrent changes in the policy instrument
on the implicit inflation target. Therefore, if Austria’s implicit inflation target has been
consistent with Germany’s target, our methodology tells policymakers whether current
monetary settings (short-term interest rates) are geared towards maintaining the target.
In addition, the methodology allows for multiple nominal target variables and shifts in
the weights attached to each objective. Thus, we may apply the indicator model to both
Germany, where the Bundesbank is primarily concerned wi~1~ the domestic price level,
and Austria, where the National Bank’s primary objective to maintain an exchange-rate
peg vis-à-vis Germany. The primary hypothesis is that Austria acquired credibility for its
exchange-rate peg by adjusting its interest-rate differential with Germany in a manner that
suggests: 1) strong responses to deviations from the exchange-rate target; 2) a desire to
maintain Austrian inflation close to that in Germany.
4The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines Austria’s ‘hard currency’
policy and reviews its inflation record relative to Germany’s. The third section presents
the indicator model of Dueker and Fischer (1994) and its application to Austria and Ger-
many. The model’s main features —implicit inflation targets and model-implied feedback
mechanisms— are also discussed. The fourth section contains the main findings from our
indicator model forGermany and Austria and provides goodness-of-fit tests of the indicator
model. The final section concludes.
II Austria’s ‘Hard-Currency’ Policy
The Austrian National Bank adopted the hard-currency policy in 1974. Figure 1 reveals
that the schilling has been revalued twiceand that since 1981 has fluctuated within anarrow
band with respect to the Deutsche mark. At the time of the first oil shock, the schilling was
revalued upwards against the Deutsche mark despite weak macroeconomic fundamentals.
The intention was to signal a stable monetary policy and constrain wage growth over the
medium term. The schilling was revalued for a second time in response to the second oil
shock during the 1979-1981 period. Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) contend that this last
revaluation of the exchange rate to the Deutsche mark triggered an adjustment process that
now makes Austria part ofan optimal currency area with Germany. Policymakers sought to
induce an increase in the degree ofreal wage flexibility in the Austrian economy, sothat real-
5wage adjustment would become the instrument for maintaining Austrian competitiveness
in the face of shocks, rather than exchange-rate adjustment.
The credibility of the hard currency policy was tested during Germany’s reunification
process, which forced Austria’s policy to take on higher than desired interest rates. Austria
coped with these strains without abandoning its exchange-rate peg against the Deutsche
mark. The schilling came away unharmed from the EMS currency crises of September 1992
and August 1993. The lack of market speculation against the Austrian schilling during this
period suggests that the hard-currency policy is recognized by financial markets.
The Austrian National Bank’s exchange rate policy consists of adjusting its interest-
rate differential with Germany. In general the two market rates have moved in tandem,
however Austrian short-term rates have been considerably more volatile. As a result of
growing confidence in the Austrian schilling, a negative short-term interest rate differential
between Austrian and German rates opened in mid-1992. The unusual negative ‘country
risk’ premium against the anchor country has helped to induce a relatively largeshort-term
capit?1 outflow from Austria to Germany.
Before the introduction of the hard-currency policy, the inflation differential between
Austria and Germany was not large on average. As can be seen from Figure 2, however,
Austrian inflation before 1974 was more volatile. The same graph also shows that for the
greater part of the hard-currency policy, Austrian inflation has followed German inflation
except on two occasions. The first stemmed from the 1973 oil shock, which hit Austria
6particularly hard. The second episode occurred in 1983-85 when Austria, as described by
Hochreiter and Winckler (1995), was subject to an idiosyncratic supply shock arising from
a crisis within nationalized industries.
Although the Bundesbank does not announce formal inflation targets, its informal tar-
gets indicate what the profile of the implicit inflation targets should befor the two countries.
The Bundesbank’s informal inflation targets are documented in von Hagen (1994) and re-
produced in Table 1. From 1975 to 1985, the Bundesbank referred to the informal inflation
target as ‘unavoidable inflation,’ and this varied from year-to-year. Since 1986 the Bundes-
bank has defined a fixed, unconditional inflation target of 0-2 percent. This target range
for inflation was not maintained, however, in the aftermath of German reunification when
inflation briefly rose above four percent.
III Description of the Empirical Model
We begin with a general empirical model and show which features and parameters are
relevant for an empirical characterization of German and Austrian monetary policy.1 The
German model takes the quarterly change in the short-term interest rate as the policy
instrument, whereas the Austrian model uses the interest-differential with Germany as the
policy instrument variable used to maintain the exchange rate. Both empirical models take
the quarterly interest-rate change, combine it with a forecast of the relationship between
‘Dueker and Fischer (1994b) provide a non-technical survey of how the indicator model relates to
McCallum’s (1993) monetary feedback mechanism.
7interest-rate changes and inflation and call this “intended” inflation for the quarter. As-
suming that the forecasts wederive mirror the consensus forecasts of tile time, our intended
inflation variable should reflect the policy intentions of the central banks across time. Fur-
thermore, our empirical models can explain fluctuations in intended inflation from three
distinct sources: the first source is variation in the baseline inflation target; the second
source is intended inflation above or below the baseline rate in the short run to maintain
a price level target; the third source recognizes that, in a small open economy, the central
bank may intervene to keep the exchange rate within a comfort zone.
The following equations incorporate these three potential motives for modifying short-
run intended inflation. Several parameters are assumed to be subject to discrete changes
via markov switching, since, for example, the Austrian National Bank’s degree of response
to exchange-rate developments has likely shifted over time, depending on its tolerance for
changes in the exchange rate. We also allow for markov switching in the variance of the
error terms, since interest rates are often thought to be conditionally heteroskedastic. The
model realistically allows for feedback from several objectives (the domestic price level and
the exchange rate) and for shifts in the weights attached to each objective. Similarly, the
implicit long-run inflation targets may not be constant across time either. Also, the extent
to which the central banks target a path for the price level, as opposed to targeting a rate of
inflation period-by-period, may be subject to change. In equations (1)-(4) below, i stands
for the short-term interest rate (or interest-rate differential for Austria), P for the price
level, P is the target price level conditional on the values of the markov state variables,
8and P is the expected target level, not conditional on the values of the state variables.
Similarly ~i sthe baseline exchange rate (in logs) conditional on the values of the state
variables, and ~i sthe baseline rate not conditional on the values of the state variables. In
the model for Germany the Deutsche mark/ U.S. dollar exchange rate is used, whereas in
the Austrian model we usethe schilling/ Duetsche mark exchange rate.
We allow for three state variables subject to markov switching:2 Si for parameters
related to inflation and/or price level targeting; 82 for parameters related to exchange-rate
targeting; and 83 for heteroskedasticity.3 In equations (1-4), the notation cx(Si) indicates
that parameter ci~ is subject to markov switching governed by state variable Si. In equations
(3), (5) and (6), ~ denotes available information at time t-1.
Interest Rate:Aln(1 + ~)t = —~0(S1~) + t~ln ((1 + ~)~)~1~_1 — ~1(Si~)[lnP — lnP]~1
~2(S2t)[1ne lne]t_i + ~(Si~, S2~) (1)
~(Si~,S2~) student-t
var[~(Sit,S2~)] ~2(S3~) — 2
Target Price Level: lnP~(S1~) = ~~(Si~) + ~1(Si~)lnP~_1 + (1 — ~1(Si~))lnP~_1 (2)
2The basic filtering and smoothing algorithms for a markov-switching model are discussed in Hamilton
(1988, 1989).
3Kim (1993) notes that markov switching in the variance is an adept alternative to GARCH models for
modeling conditional heteroskedasticity or “ARCH” effects.
9Expected Target: lnP~ =
Baseline Exch. Rate: ln~(S2~)=
Expected Baseline: ln~ =
Prob(Slt = i, S2, = j, S3, = k j Yt_1) =
~Prob(Sit = i I ~)ln~(Si~ = i)
t52(82t)lnet_i + (1 — 82(S2~))lne~_1
Prob(S2t = j Y~)ln~~(S2~ = j)
Prob(Sit = I
Prob(S2t =j }‘_i)’Prob(S3t =
P(Si~= 0 1 sit_i = 0) = P1
P(S1~= 1 I Sit_i = 1) =
P(S2~= 0 I S2t_i = 0) = P2
P(S2~= 1 S2,~_~ = 1) = q2
P(S3~= 0 I S3~_i= 0) = p~
P(S3t=i~S3t_1=i)=q3
The parameter )~represents the baseline or long-run target rate of inflation, because
intended inflation will equal ~ when price-level and exchange-rate gaps equal zero in the
longrun. This parameter is subject to markov switching to capture changes in the long-run
desired rateof inflation. From equation (1), notethat the partial derivative between today’s
interest-rate change and )~is negative. Thus, a program of action designed to reduce the
trend rate of inflation logically begins with increases in short-term interest rates. Similarly,
if the forecast of inflationary pressure associated with a given interest-rate setting were to





(6)The sizes of the feedback coefficients, )~~(Si~) and .A2(S2~),determine the rate at which
one tries to close price-level and exchange-rate gaps through policy actions. A low feedback
coefficient implies that the central bank prefers gradualism as opposed to rapid adjustment
and return to the target path. A priori, we would expect German monetary policy to
respond primarily to developments in domestic inflation, so ~ which measures the strength
of exchange-rate feedback, should be relatively small. For Austria on the other hand,
exchange-rate feedback, as measured by )‘2, is expected to be large, while some shocks to
the domestic price level must be accommodated by limiting the size of)~.That is, Austria
will sometimes have to import German price level shocks to its own domestic price level.
Equation (2) permits this period’s price level target to be a weighted average of last
period’s actual and target levels plus trend growth. Such rebasing of the targets occurs for
values of 8~< 1. Consequently, one-time shifts in the price level are gradually accommo-
dated into the target path. As
8
i decreases from one, the rate of accommodation increases.
A similar rebasing scheme is allowed for the implicit exchange-rate target. McCallum
(1993) has used a similar weighting scheme, however in his model ~ remains constant. We
use the same weighting scheme with ‘52 for exchange-rate gaps.
Because of the autoregressive nature of equations (2) and (4), inferences of the state
at time t would depend on the entire history of past realizations of the state variables if
it were not for the collapsing procedure of equations (3) and (5). Kim (1994) provides
the justification for the collapsing procedure and he notes that its use generally introduces
iia small approximation to the evaluation of the likelihood function in a markov-switching
model. He finds, however, that the approximation does not materially affect the parameter
estimates.
An independence assumption in equation (6) for the state variables reduces the number
of parameters needed for the transition probabilities. With k state variables, each taking
on two values, one would need to estimate (2~1~)2 — (
2
k) transition probabilities. Whereas
with the independence assumption, there are only 2k estimated parameters. In our model
with three state variables, the reduction due to the independence assumption is from 56 to
6 estimated parameters, so it is necessary to make estimation feasible.
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximizing the log
of the expected likelihood or
mn ~ Prob.(Sit = i, S2~ = j, S3~ = k Y~_i)L~’3~~) (7)
t—i i=Oj=Ok=O
where the student-t densities are
mnL~,3,k) = lnF(.5(n + 1)) — mnr(.sn) — .5ln(irna2(S3~= k))
-.5(n + i)ln (1+ ~ ~) (8)
and F is the gamma function.
12TV Estimation Results for Germany and Austria
The empirical results, which are presented in the form of parameter estimates, graphs
and a goodness of fit test, suggest that German monetary policy is most concerned with
the domestic price level as a nominal target, rather than its exchange rate with the U.S.
dollar. For Austria, on the other hand, the level of the probability-weighted exchange-rate
feedback parameter )~2is relatively high throughout our quarterly sample from 1972:1 to
1994:2. The model-implied target path for Austrian inflation suggests that the exchange
rate peg to the Deutsche mark is sustainable, because the target path of )~in Austria is on
average very close to that in Germany. This parameter hovers slightly above 3.25 percent in
Austria, ignoring an upward blip in 1984. In Germany the unconditional valueof )¼~ is 2.87
percent, with .\~=3.50as the most prevalent state. These values are within one standard
deviation of each other, which implies that we cannot detect a significant difference in the
long-run inflation targets across the two countries.
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates, where some of the parameters are set to
zero according to preliminary estimates of the full model. Figure 3a shows that the model
implied target path for German inflation moves in a narrow range between 1 and 4 percent.
The model implied target path for German inflation matches the Bundesbank’s informal
inflation target documented in Table 1 until 1989. Theresults suggest that the reunification
process forced the Bundesbank to take on a slightly higher baseline inflation rate. During
13the 1990s Germany’s baseline inflation path has remained at about 3 percent, although it
began falling in 1993. For Germany, the two states for ~ are 0.70 and 3.5 percent, with
the implied target generally above 3 percent, except for the period 1987-90 when it hovered
around 1 percent. Figure 3b shows that the implied inflation target for Austria almost
always remains between 3 and 4 percent. The profile of the Austrian target path is within
one percent of the German target path for most of the sample. The inflation target path
for Austria is nearly constant, due to low persistence in the high inflation state for Austria,
as q1 barely exceeds 0.5.
That the model implies a nearly constant baseline inflation path for Austria might be
somewhat puzzling, given the swings observed in Austria’s actual inflation performance.
To check whether exchange-rate feedback caused Austria’s actual inflation to deviate from
the baseline rate, that is, whether Austria had to import inflation and disinflation from
Germany to maintain the exchange-rate target, we re-ran the model forcing the exchange-
rate feedback parameter, )~.2,to equal zero in both states. If exchange-rate feedback were
an important source ofgaps between actual inflation and the nearly-constant baseline rate,
then the estimated baseline rate would have to become more variable ifthe model allowed
exchange-rate feedback to explain fluctuations in Austrian inflation. Figure 3c confirms
this conjecture by plotting the estimated baseline rate of Austrian inflation coming from a
model that sets A2
= 0 in both states.4 In the restricted model, the estimated baseline rate
4The log-likelihood decreases from the value in Table 2 of-115.2 to -120.7. We cannot use this difference
to conduct a standard likelihood-ratio test, however, since P2 and q~,are not identified under the null.
14of Austrian inflation varies from under 3 percent to more than 6 percent. Thus, failure to
include exchange-rate feedback in the model would spuriously lead one to conclude that
Austrian monetary authorities have had relatively large swings in their implicit inflation
targets. If this were true, the Austrian schilling would not have much credibility with
financial markets.
The feedback coefficients from the price level are zero for both Austria and Germany,
which implies that past inflation surprises are accommodated immediately. The exchange
rate feedback in the high state is .865 for Austria and is zero in the low feedback state.
German monetary policy, on the other hand, appears to concentrate on targeting domestic
inflation, rather than the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. For Germany full-model
estimates show that A2 is essentially zero in both states. The degree of exchange-rate
feedback for Austria is best illustrated by weighting the two values of A2 by the probabilities
of being in the two states. Austrian monetary policy appears to have taken extensive
feedback from the exchange rate. Figure 4 illustrates that the feedback parameter on the
exchange rate in Austria has varied between 0.2 and 0.8 throughout the sample period,
and appears to have settled at about 0.6 now that the exchange rate is very stable. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the degree of exchange feedback diminished for brief periods.
This period coincides with Austria’s revaluation of the schilling at the time of the second
oil shock. The weighting parameter 82 is about .85 in both states, which implies that
Austrian monetary policy essentially maintains an exchange-rate target in levels, rather
than accommodate past shocks rapidly.




from equation (1), switch between .43 and 1.71 for Germany and .23 and 1.49 for Austria.
Thus, the standard deviation changes by at least a factor of four between the two states.
Statistical tests aiming to demonstrate the significance of markov switching, however, are
hampered by the fact that the transition probabilities are not identified under the null of
no switching. Hansen (1992) discusses this issue and presents a simulation methodology
to arrive at empirical estimates of the critical values for likelihood-ratio tests. Because the
simulations required for each critical value take a substantial amount of computer time,
we do not pursue that strategy. Instead, we present goodness-of-fit tests of the model’s
specification. With respect to heteroskedasticity specifically, we notethat markov switching
in the variances reduces the serial dependence in the squared residuals from that in the
squared dependent variable: The Box-Pierce statistics for Austria go from 56.8 in the raw
data to 31.9 in the squared residuals. These statistics do not have a standard Chi-square
distribution, however, because the residuals are not assumed to be normal and i.i.d,
As a formal test of the model specification, we present goodness-of-fit test statistics,
rather than a series of likelihood ratio tests, because, as noted above, the LR test statistics
havenonstandard distributions when parameters (transition probabilities) are not identified
under the null. We divide the 90 observations into 10 groups based on the probability of
16observing a value smaller than the actual residual. If the model’s time-varying density
function fits the data well, these probabilities should be uniformly distributed between
zero and one. Following Vlaar and Palm (1993),
= >~I~ where I~t = 1 if (j ~ <EF(~~,ö) ~
= 0, otherwise
Theexpected value ofthe cumulative density function is taken across the eight combinations
of the three states that might have held at each time, where F is the student-t cumulative
density for Austria and the standard normal cumulative density for Germany and 6i sthe
parameter vector.
The goodness-of-fit test statistic equals T/10~~1(n~ — T/10)2 and is distributed x~
under the null. The specifications are not rejected for either Austria or Germany, because
their test statistics equal 6.4 and 5.6, respectively, neither of which is rejected as a x~
variate.
Overall, the indicator model provides a general framework for a multiple-objectives
feedback mechanism. Application to both Germany and Austria returns the expected
finding that German monetary policy has been most concerned with the domestic price
level, rather than the exchange rate. Since the indicator model uses the changes in the
short-term interest rate instrument as the policy information variable, it is important to
check that the model reasonably describes actual policy actions. Figure 5a illustrates
17the ability of the feedback model to explain changes in Germany’s short-term interest rate.
The model does quite well in explaining the direction andvolatility of interest-rate changes,
except in the early 1970s when the model called for tighter policy than actually occurred.
Interestingly, the model also overpredicts Germany’s short-term interest rates in the post-
reunification 1990s. Actual changes in Austria’s interest-rate differential with Germany are
plotted with the model-implied changes in Figure 5b. The model successfully captures the
large decrease in the volatility of the interest-rate differential that has take place as the
exchange-rate peg has become tighter and more and credible.
Conclusions
A test is developed that determines whether the current monetary settings are consistent
with a central bank’s pre-announced target, which could be an exchange-rate target, an in-
flation target, or some other nominal target. We test the sustainability of an exchange-rate
peg by comparing the implicit inflation targcts between the anchor and pegging countries.
To identify the implicit inflation targets, an indicator model is used which includes domestic
price and exchange rate feedback. The proposed test is applied to the Austrian experience
of exchange rate targeting, however Dueker and Fischer (1995) also show that estimating
the inflation target path has extended application for evaluating the performance of central
banks that have announced explicit inflation targets.
18Our empirical results find that Austria’s hard currency policy has proven to be sus-
tainable, because the path of the Austrian implicit inflation target converged quickly to a
level very near the German target. The differential between the implicit inflation targets
for the two countries is estimated to be less than one percent on average for our sample
period, 1973-1994. In fact, we find Austria’s implicit long-run inflation target to be nearly
constant, so that fluctuations in Austrian inflation are largely due to the need to import
inflation and disinflation from Germany as needed to maintain the exchange-rate target.
We also note that because the indicator model allows for multiple feedback variables,
we could incorporate information from futures markets or expectations of future inflation
embedded in bond yields, as in Svensson (1994). Addition of feedback from such forward-
looking variables is a topic of future research.
19Appendix
The interest rate forecasts for the indicator model are based on a model by Kim (1994),
which allows for two types of uncertainty. The first arises from heteroskedasticity in the
error terms. This is modelled by a markov switching process, which tries to match the per-
sistence of periods of high and low volatility in the data. The second source of uncertainty
arises as economic agents are obliged to infer unknown or changing regression coefficients.
The variable i is the 3-month Euro rate and P is the consumer price index. The model
generating the forecasts is




Probability(S~= 0 St_i = 0) = Pi
Probability(St = 1 St_i = 1) = P2
The variances of the error terms are assumed to switch between a low and a high state
20according to a first-order markov process. Persistence of low and high volatility states
is rncreasmg in Pi and P2, respectively. Note that the markov switching in the forecast
equation (9) is separate from the markov switching in the interest-rate equation (1).
The time-varying coefficients, assume that the state variables, /3~follow a random walk
process:
i3~ = t3~—~ + Vt (10)
Vt Normal(0, Q)
The random walk assumption suggests that agents need information before changing their
views about the relationships among variables.
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Source: von Hagen (1994).
24Table 2: Indicator Models for Germany and Austria
parameter Germany Austria










6~(Sl= 0) n.a. n.a.
‘5i(Sl = 1) n.a. n.a.
A2(S2 = 0) 0 .8648
(.379)
A2(52=1) 00
‘52(82 = 0) n.a. 0.8534
(.169)
62(82 = 1) n.a. 0.8406
(.231)


































No. of parameters 8 14
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Some of the param~rs are set to zero
based on preliminary estimates of the full model.
If feedback parameters are zero in both states, 6s are not identified.Exchange rate: schillings per D-mark (100*Iog)




























































































































Baseline Inflation Rate for Austria when exch. rate feedback is zero
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